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The 2017 Salmon August Fire: A Tale of Wildfire Complexity

Fire effects in Etna Mill Creek, the municipal watershed for Etna, California.

In the summer of 2017, the Marble Mountains Wilderness in Northern California became the stage for a complex and dramatic wildfire event known as the Salmon August Fire. This fire, which began as a small lightning-sparked blaze, would go on to challenge fire managers, threaten communities, and reshape the landscape over the course of more than three months.

The fire began with a lightning strike on June 25, 2017, deep in the backcountry of the Marble Mountain Wilderness, near the North Fork of the Salmon River. Initially dubbed the Island Fire due to its proximity to Lake of the Island, it was reported the following day. Fire managers, recognizing the remote and rugged nature of the terrain, opted for an alternative suppression approach using Minimum Impact Suppression Tactics (MIST).

This decision was influenced by several factors. The region had experienced an unusually wet winter, with snowpack at high elevations reaching 180% of normal and near-record rainfall. As a result, the fire began in wet, green fuels still moist from the heavy winter snow. This led to a slow initial spread, with only 65 acres burned by July 2, a week after ignition.

Shifting Strategies and Growing Concerns

As July progressed, the fire management strategy began to evolve. Bulldozers and CalFire suppression crews were brought in to construct fire lines northeast of the fire perimeter and open old roads in Kidder Creek for access. This shift to more aggressive tactics suggested growing concerns about the fire’s potential.

The situation escalated dramatically on August 21 when thunderstorms rolled through the region, shifting winds and pushing the fire eastward. Spot fires became established east of the Pacific Crest Trail in the Shelly Fork, Babs Fork, and Glendenning Fork of Kidder Creek above the Scott Valley. As the fire pushed into the State Responsibility Area, a unified command structure was established between CALFIRE and the U.S. Forest Service.

The Little North Fork of the Salmon River burned at relatively high severity in the Salmon August Fire during extreme fire weather.

The Wallow Fire burned in a series of uphill runs from the North Fork of the Salmon River to the crest of the Salmon Mountains.
The Wallow Fire burned in a series of uphill runs from the North Fork of the Salmon River to the crest of the Salmon Mountains.

The Wallow Fire incident involved complex firefighting operations over several days in August. Crews initiated hand and aerial ignition from August 19 to 21, starting from the Pacific Crest Trail (PCT) near Shelly and Timothy Gulch. These backburning operations, aimed at creating a fuel break, expanded the fire to 3,843 acres and formed a large crescent at the northeast perimeter. The strategy was to burn from the PCT towards the North Fork of the Salmon River, starving the main fire of fuel. However, this coincided with increased fire activity and unfavorable weather, potentially exacerbating the situation. While the Wallow Fire was being actively suppressed west of the PCT, the separate Island Fire was allowed to burn out naturally in the rocky terrain near Abbott Creek, highlighting the varied approaches used in wildfire management based on specific conditions and locations.

The Big Western Run

The most significant event in the fire’s history occurred between August 29 and September 5, in what fire managers dubbed “the big western run.” During these eight days, the fire burned 46,668 acres, accounting for 70% of its total area. Driven by strong southwest winds, high temperatures, and low relative humidity, the fire raced over 10 miles across the Little North Fork of the Salmon River and over Chimney Rock to the headwaters of Morehouse, Steinacher, and Crapo Creek.

The fire, now referred to as the Wallow Fire and encompassing the entire Salmon August Complex, ripped through areas previously burned in 2006 and 2008. It created spot fires up to two miles ahead of the main front, with roughly 40 spot fires established west of the fire perimeter. By September 3, the fire had grown to 48,471 acres, with significant stand-replacing fire in the Little North Fork watershed.

Community Impact and Fire Management Challenges

As the fire grew, its impact on nearby communities intensified. Evacuation orders were issued from Etna Summit to Sawyers Bar and Nordheimer Flat, with structural protection implemented in these areas. The fire threatened Etna’s municipal watershed, the source of drinking water for the town.

Fire managers faced numerous challenges, including limited visibility due to smoke that precluded the use of aerial resources and infrared flights, making accurate fire mapping impossible at times. They constructed massive dozer lines on ridges above Kidder Creek, Patterson Creek, Whisky Creek, and near Whisky Butte, as well as a large contingency line from Kidder Creek to Etna Mill Creek west of the Scott Valley.

The Klamath National Forest (KNF) has faced significant challenges in its use of fire retardant, particularly during the Salmon August Fire. Extensive application, including over 100,000 gallons dropped near Whisky Butte on a single day, raised environmental concerns, especially when retardant entered municipal watersheds like Etna Mill Creek. The Forest Service reported spending $638,643 on retardant alone, not including mixing, delivery, or application costs, with hourly expenses sometimes reaching hundreds of thousands of dollars. However, the KNF has struggled with inadequate tracking and reporting of retardant use, particularly in avoidance areas and ESA habitats. Internal communications reveal frustration among staff about the lack of transparency and cooperation from fire personnel in providing accurate information about retardant drops. These issues highlight the need for improved documentation, increased public transparency, enhanced regulation, and better oversight to balance effective fire suppression with environmental protection and fiscal responsibility. Pressure on fire personnel to comply with reporting requirements is seen as crucial for addressing these ongoing challenges.

“Because the fire retardant consultation is national, we have been directed to field recon anything that looks to be a drop in avoidance area and notify by reporting in the online tool.

From my experience… fire personnel are often not forthcoming with information on retardant drops, and that has not changed.

For example, on our other big fire complex (Eclipse) on the KNF, they gave READs no information at all for weeks even after lead READs asked, and I reminded our forest aviation officer that they need to provide READs and me this info (because I was tasked with doing the online reporting). When I reminded our forest aviation officer to get me this information he just basically shined me on and said they were keeping it all to the ridges… kinda hard to believe, but that’s what he said about a month into the fires. When they finally did provide hand drawn maps to the lead READ, and disconnected tables with volumes, it looked as if no retardant was dropped in avoidance areas, so we did not enter any misapplications for the Eclipse Fire (which seems hard to believe). Fire personnel are often not forthcoming with misapplication information… as a READ and specialist, it feels like if you chase it long enough you might get some information… but is that the best use of our time?? Probably not. From my perspective, until fire personnel are pressured to do this reporting and understand that its required reporting for their action, things won’t change.”

Internal Email between undisclosed Forest Service Employees. September 9, 2017 to October 2, 2017.

Interestingly, while the fire showed extreme behavior in some areas, previous burn scars played a crucial role in its eventual containment. The 2013 Salmon Complex Fire and 2014 Whites Fire footprints resisted burning, acting as natural barriers to the Salmon August Fire’s spread. This phenomenon highlights the complex relationship between fire history and current fire behavior in forest ecosystems.

The Salmon August Fire of 2017 serves as a prime example of the complexity of modern wildfire management. From its humble beginnings as a small, lightning-caused fire in a wet year, to its explosive growth during “the big western run,” the fire challenged assumptions and tested the limits of fire management strategies. It demonstrated the crucial interplay between weather, fuels, topography, and fire history in shaping fire behavior. Moreover, it underscored the immense challenges faced by fire managers in protecting both natural resources and human communities in an era of increasing wildfire risk.

2017_salmon_august_fire_report-24

sources:
Inciweb News, Island Fire Daily Reports. National Wildfire Coordinating Group: https://www.inciweb.nwcg.gov
Inciweb News, Salmon August Fire Daily Reports. National Wildfire Coordinating Group: https://www.inciweb.nwcg.gov
USDA. Forest Service. Salmon August Fire, Operations Map. 2017
Klamath Forest Alliance


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